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Guido AlfAni*
The Famine of the 1590s in Northern Italy. 
An Analysis of the Greatest « System Shock » 
of Sixteenth Century
Abstract. This article analyzes the extremely severe famine of the 1590s in northern 
Italy, triggered by several consecutive years of bad weather at a time of particularly acute 
population pressure on the available resources. Their failure fuelled a general « system 
shock » for the social, economic and demographic structures of Northern Italy, leading to 
protest, violence and general social and economic disorder. The article recurs to a large 
database of demographic time series to identify the areas struck worst by the famine. It 
then focuses on the region Emilia-Romagna, and lastly provides a case study of the rural 
town of Nonantola, for which rare data about age at death during the famine are used. 
The article suggests that the 1590s famine was not solely the result of the combination 
of climate, agrarian technology and demographic density, but was a complex « human 
failure » than can be fully understood only by taking into account also institutions, cultu-
re, social and economic behaviour, and even psychological factors.
Résumé. La famine de 1590 en Italie du Nord. Une analyse de la plus grande « crise 
systémique » du xvie siècle
Cet article analyse la grande famine qui s’abattit sur l’Italie du Nord dans les années 
1590, à la suite de plusieurs années de mauvaises conditions climatiques, survenues 
dans un contexte de forte pression démographique. Cet épisode provoqua une « crise 
systémique » qui déstabilisa l’ensemble des structures sociales, économiques et démo-
graphiques de l’Italie du Nord et donna naissance à un ensemble de désordres écono-
miques et sociaux. Par l’analyse de séries démographiques, appliquées notamment au 
cas de l’Émilie-Romagne et de la communauté rurale de Nonantola, l’article montre 
que la famine des années 1590 ne résulta pas seulement de la conjonction de facteurs 
climatiques, techniques et démographiques particuliers, mais qu’elle fut aussi la consé-
quence d’une faillite humaine complexe, qu’on ne peut comprendre que si l’on prend 
en compte les institutions, les comportements sociaux et économiques ainsi que les 
facteurs culturels et psychologiques.
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on Social Dynamics and IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Via 
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At the beginning of the 1590s, Northern Italy was struck by a famine 
whose scope and gravity soon appeared to be unprecedented. The famine 
was caused by several consecutive years of bad weather which damaged 
directly the crops and also favoured the insurgence of maladies such as the 
ruggine or wheat rust which later spread to France and to other parts of Eu-
rope. Especially in 1591-1592, inding cereals became a nightmare for the 
provision authorities who often had to admit that they were unable to collect 
food for the urban populations. Their failure fuelled what can be deined 
as a general « system shock » for the social, economic and demographic 
structures of Northern Italy, leading to protest, violence and general social 
and economic disorder.
With the help of a large database of demographic time series related 
to cities, towns and villages in the area, the aim of this article is to identify 
exactly who was struck by the famine, in order to evaluate the capability of 
different environments to react to a shortage of wheat and other grain, and 
also to better identify what caused the different intensity of the crisis at the 
local level. In particular, the analysis will shed light on the functioning of 
urban food provision authorities (the Annone) during such a severe short-
age, and will allow for comparison between cities and villages: the latter 
being only apparently favoured by their proximity to the countryside and by 
their food-producing orientation.
Following a description of the general characteristics of the crisis and 
of its macro-demographic consequences (section 1), the article will focus 
on Emilia, an area in the middle of the Po plain which was among those 
worst struck, in order to better understand the effectiveness of urban food 
provision authorities in times of extreme stress (section 2). Lastly a case 
study, that of the rural community of Nonantola near Modena, will be ana-
lyzed to provide further information about the nature of this system shock 
as a « demographic », or « mortality », crisis (section 3).
Guido Alfani
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1. The worst Italian famine ever?
In Autumn 1589 many parts of Italy were ravaged by heavy rain. We 
know from chronicles and other sources that loods occurred in Campania 
and Tuscany, as well as in the city of Rome. This was just the beginning of 
a long period of climatic instability: in Spring 1590 there was heavy rain 
in Emilia and Lombardy and storms and loods in the mainland domains of 
the Republic of Venice 1. Soon, the bad weather favoured the appearance of 
grain diseases such as wheat rust, which further damaged the harvest 2.
The adverse meteorological situation faced by Italy is only one exam-
ple of a more general situation of climatic instability, whose effects were 
Europe-wide at least 3. Since Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s classic book 
on the history of climate 4, we know that a particularly cold period began 
around years 1550-1560, with Alpine ice-ields reaching a maximum ex-
tent by 1600: the acute phase of a « Little Ice Age » probably spanning 
mid-ifteenth to mid-eighteenth century, but whose exact chronology is 
still the object of much debate 5. On the other hand, recent analysis of Late 
Medieval famines coupling data about grain prices and yields with reined 
information about weather (as obtained by dendrochronological series and 
study of the Antarctic layers of ice) led to the conclusion that: 
« [the most notable famines] can have been the product of no ordinary runs of ad-
verse weather. Instead, each was almost certainly the outcome of some abnormal 
and extreme short-term climatic perturbation ». 6 
Unfortunately, this kind of information is currently much more abun-
dant for Northern Europe than for Southern. Consequently, the informa-
tion about weather used in this article will be mostly of a qualitative na-
ture 7. As shall be seen, it was some continuous years of bad weather, 
happening at a time when the global climate was cooling, that triggered 
the worst famine ever faced by Northern Italy during the Late Medieval 
or Early Modern period.
1. DaviDson, N. S., 1985; Basini, G. L., 1970; CorraDi, A., 1973.
2. alfani, G., 2010a; aymarD, M., 1973; ferrarese, A., 2010.
3. Clark, P., 1985.
4. le roy laDurie, E., 1983.
5. appleBy, A. B., 1980; CampBell, C., 2009; 2010; fagan, B., 2000; loehle, C. & mC-
CulloCh, J. H., 2008.
6. CampBell, C, 2009, p. 10.
7. See G. alfani, 2010c, for a more detailed reconstruction.
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
20
While in North Europe, the peak of the crisis was reached in 1596, 
Italy was considerably more precocious. The irst year characterized by 
very poor crops was 1590: a fact of which the local authorities were well 
aware. In June, immediately after the harvest, the governor of Modena 
(Ferrante Estense Tassoni) informed the Duke of Ferrara that the new crop 
of grain had yielded only a third compared to the previous year (which 
admittedly had been a good one) 8. Later it became apparent that also the 
grapes would provide a very poor yield. What preoccupied the food pro-
vision authorities of the Italian cities and states, however, was not only 
the scarcity of the crops – but the extent of the crisis, which eventually 
affected practically all the most fertile areas of the peninsula, from Sicily 
and Puglia to the Po Plain 9. As will be shown in section 2, this fact was at 
the root of a real « system shock » which not only made it impossible to 
rely on market forces to assure the local presence of food 10, but also made 
it very dificult for the authorities to react in effective ways. Of course, 
some grain-producing regions were struck worse than others, both by bad 
weather and by epidemics of diseases often associated with famine such as 
typhus 11, but all of them were affected, at least to a degree.
As I argue elsewhere 12, the acute character assumed by the crisis in 
Italy, and maybe even its precociousness, are not dependent solely on me-
teorological conditions but could not be fully understood without keeping 
in mind the fact that the maximum carrying capacity of the Italian demo-
graphic system(s) had been reached. As suggested by a reconstruction of 
births for the whole of Northern Italy presented in Figure 1 13, the popula-
tion reached a maximum in the 1580s, entered into a crisis in the 1590s, 
and at the beginning of the seventeenth century reached again the pre-crisis 
8. Basini, G. L., 1970, p. 67-68.
9. Del panta, L. & livi BaCCi, M., 1977; Del panta, L., 1980, p. 144-150.
10.  We should be careful in implying the existence of free markets in the Late Medieval 
and Early Modern period. For a discussion of the implications of this for a historical analysis 
of economic-demographic dynamics, see J. hatCher & M. Bailey, 2001, p. 63-65.
11.  Typhus was responsible for the worst rises in mortality rates to be found during 
the crisis. See L. Del panta, 1980, about the role played by this disease in the demographic 
history of Italy, and also G. alfani, 2010a, about its presence in sixteenth century Italy (ac-
cording to the famous physician Gerolamo Fracastoro, typhus was a new disease for Italy, 
appearing for the irst time in 1505).
12. alfani, g., 2007a; 2011a.
13.  It must be noted that the use of births as an estimate for total population is not 
devoid of problems, but is unavoidable for a period when parish books of deaths were gener-
ally unavailable (they were made mandatory in Catholic areas only by the Rituale Romanum 
introduced in 1614). About this issue, the methodology used in elaborating the reconstruction, 
and for a fuller comment on it, see G. alfani, 2007a.
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level without being able to breach it. As shown by a recent reconstruction 
of the trend of the Italian population from the times of the Roman Empire, 
the same maximum of population found in the 1580s and 1620s had been 
reached (and subsequently lost) already in the irst or second century and 
in the fourteenth, before the Black Death 14. This empirical regularity sug-
gests a long-lasting limit to population growth in the Italian peninsula. 
The 1630 plague, by killing about 1/3 of the inhabitants of Northern Italy 
only sparing most of Liguria, provided a kind of solution to the imbal-
ance between population and resources allowing time to complete 
the agrarian innovations that would permit a further growth of population 
in the eighteenth century. Some of these innovations, and particularly the 
spread of crops coming from the New World such as maize, would not 
have been possible before the seventeenth century, or before the end of the 
sixteenth at most, and required many years to be completed 15.
Figure 1. Reconstruction of births in Northern Italy, 1550-1628 
Source. Database G. alfani.
Bad weather, then, struck Italian demographic and agrarian systems 
at a particularly dificult time. This was also a period of transformation for 
the Italian rural areas, especially in the north: a transformation which was 
however still incomplete, or was unavoidably slow and unable to sustain a 
population growing too quickly notwithstanding the processes of agrarian 
14. lo CasCio, L. & malanima, P., 2005.
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innovation at work 16. In section 2, the case of Emilia will be developed 
also in this perspective. This demographic fragility has little to do with 
an economic fragility. Contrary to the hypothesis put forward by Carlo 
Cipolla 17 that the boom of the Italian economy in the second half of the 
sixteenth century, after the end of the Wars of Italy fought by France and 
Empire for supremacy over the peninsula, was only an « Indian summer », 
I think that the economic recovery of the Italian states was very sound 
and was inally compromised by exogenous shocks: particularly by the 
plagues of 1629-1630 and of 1656-1657. In this perspective, the famine 
of the 1590s was not, as Cipolla and others 18 had it, the sign of an incum-
bent economic crisis, but it was simply the signal of a dificult relationship 
between man and resources precipitated by a fast demographic growth: a 
growth, which was in itself proof of the solidity of the Italian economies. 
This would also be demonstrated by the fact that the population recovered 
quickly after the famine (Figure 1), suggesting that the high level of both 
population and economic development attained by the 1580s possessed a 
degree of stability and was not short lived as Cipolla argued. In the north 
only the plague of 1629-1630, which struck at a time of ierce interna-
tional competition, particularly from North European countries, was able 
to cause lasting damage to the economy of the area. This hypothesis is 
developed elsewhere 19.
Even if the crops were terrible already in 1590, it is in the following 
years that the real crisis began. This is not due to a further worsening of the 
situation, but to the fact that the reserves had become exhausted, and that 
cities and communities were now badly indebted given the cost of buying 
grain abroad, especially in Northern Europe where the situation was not 
yet critical. This is the case of the grand-dukes of Tuscany and of the Re-
public of Genoa who bought grain in the Baltic 20, or of the city of Palermo 
that tried to get some through English merchants 21. The situation worsened 
further in 1592 and in certain areas of Italy, such as Emilia, also 1593 was 
16.  alfani, g., 2007a; 2011a.
17.  Cipolla, C. M., 1997.
18.  DaviDson, N. S., 1985.
19.  alfani, g., 2010a; 2010b; 2011b.
20.  F. BrauDel & R. romano, 1951, measured a sharp rise in the number of ships from 
Danzig, Amsterdam, Hamburg and Lübeck reaching Livorno (quickly becoming the main 
harbour of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany), beginning in 1590-1591 (31 ships), reaching a peak 
in 1591-1592 (87 ships) and staying high in the inal phase of the crisis (59 ships in 1592-
1593). According to Braudel and Romano, this was the result of growing demand for grain in 
the Mediterranean caused by repeated bad harvests.
21.  BrauDel, f. & romano, r., 1951; CorraDi, A., 1973; Costantini, C., 1978.
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characterized by bad crops. The overall situation, however, had changed, 
the crisis was no longer general, and provision authorities could buy the 
food they needed with comparable ease.
As already explained, for this period information about mortality (buri-
als) is still scarce and related almost exclusively to urban environments. The 
data for the rural community of Nonantola discussed in section 3 is the rare 
exception. If we want to analyze in detail the territorial extent of the crisis, 
and its ability to affect very diverse environments, we have to look once 
again at fertility (baptisms). Historical demographers have established that 
most food crises did not cause a sharp increase in deaths, but had much more 
visible effects regarding marriages and births. As a consequence, it has been 
suggested that the trend of births, not deaths, is the indicator most sensitive 
to dearth and famine 22. Also related to this is the distinction between « mor-
tality crises », deined speciically as an increase in deaths over a normal 
level, and the more complex notion of « demographic crises », which also 
takes into account fertility, marriage and migration 23.
The available time series of baptisms, which I used to construct a large 
database covering all of Northern Italy 24, conirm that the peak of the crisis 
was reached in 1591-1592: it is in 1592 that the drop in births was the most 
severe, and this was the year when the famine began to affect also people 
living in the mountains. One can hypothesise that a lesser dependence on 
the grain harvest enabled the population to resist the famine for a certain pe-
riod but not indeinitely. It is also probable that mountain dwellers suffered 
less than others from typical complications of famine such as typhus, more 
severe in crowded areas such as cities and the rich lowland countryside (we 
know of epidemics of typhus in the cities of Bologna, Piacenza, Faenza, 
Modena, Reggio, Parma, Ferrara, Mantova, but also in Veneto, Tuscany and 
Lazio 25). The mountains, though, are the only environment where we ind 
communities seemingly spared by the famine or at least affected so slightly 
as to show no demographic reaction.
To appreciate the way in which the famine affected different parts of 
Northern Italy, it is useful to refer to a map (Figure 2) in which the presence 
or absence of the crisis has been hypothesized by taking as a reference lo-
calities that undoubtedly suffered because of it, as conirmed by historical 
22.  Cattini, M., 1983; Bellettini, A., 1987.
23.  gouBert, p., 1968; alfani, g. & gourDon, V., 2009.
24.  About this database and its characteristics, see G. alfani, 2007a; 2010a. 
25.  alfani, g., 2010a.
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
24
research. In these localities I found an average reduction in births of 44% 26 
and on the basis of this I formulated hypotheses about the occurrence of 
the crisis elsewhere 27. In the map, no distinction is made between urban 
and rural communities because the aim is to show the extent of a crisis that 
involved both cities and rural areas. The scarcity of cases related to the 
North-East is not due to the absence of crisis, but to a scarcity of available 
information 28.
Figure 2. The famine of the 1590s: geographic extent
The map well illustrates the generalized extent and the severity of the 
famine: in the early 1590s, inding grain in Italy must have seemed nigh 
26.  This i gure was obtained by comparing the average level of births in the years 1586-
1590 with that of 1591-1592.
27.  I have hypothesized the presence of a crisis where the fall in births was equal or 
superior to 22% (half the average value found where a crisis is certain). I have deined prob-
able the recurrence for reductions of between 15% and 21,9% and possible between 4% and 
14,9%. Where the births dropped less than 4% or increased, it is probable that there was no 
famine or that it was very mild.
28.  Note that testing the spatial extent of the crisis required me to avoid selecting the 
cases considered, using instead all available time series of baptisms. These time series were 








impossible, a veritable nightmare for the food provision authorities. The 
situation is even more striking, if we consider that in the area in the map 
characterized by a prevalence of black spots, the reduction in births com-
pared to the pre-crisis period is equal to 22% at least: a measure, however, 
which at the local level was often exceeded (the average reduction is 45.5% 
with peaks close to 80%). If births are very sensitive indicators of the oc-
currence of a food crisis, the famine of the 1590s was characterized also 
by exceptional mortality. In Bologna for example we ind, between 1587 
and 1595, a drop in total population of about 18% within the city; 21% in 
the suburbs; 13% in the rest of the diocese 29. Also in Milan and Venice an 
increase in mortality has been underlined 30 and in some cases, such as the 
small cities of Carpi and Sabbioneta, the famine was the cause of a dramatic 
drop in population (minus 30 to 40%) which however is only partially due 
to mortality since permanent migration also played an important role. In 
these latter cases, it is the loss of the privileged status of capital that makes 
a city less attractive. The famine, then, becomes the opportunity to breach 
a psychological resistance to emigrate, moving to places characterised by 
better expectations 31.
Looking at the few blank circles corresponding to places where the 
reduction in births was modest (inferior to 4%) or non-existent, we note 
that the places spared are concentrated at the edge of the Po plain, along 
the Alpine arc and in certain areas of the Ligurian Apennines. In almost 
every case these are mountain villages, especially if we discount some 
parishes of the suburbs of Bologna where the evaluations may have been 
distorted by the small number of annual baptisms (the lower the number 
of baptisms per year, the greater the inluence on the demographic trend 
of random variations). Factors such as differences in the regime of land 
ownership surely had an impact on individual access to resources, but 
in such a severe crisis they did not determine which communities were 
spared the worst consequences, as has been shown elsewhere 32. Also dif-
ferences in the action of food provision authorities or in access to markets 
do not seem to be decisive 33.
29.  Bellettini, A., 1961.
30.  Del panta, l., 1980, p. 148-149.
31.  alfani, g., 2008; 2010a.
32.  alfani, g., 2007a, where also differences in the crops cultivated were considered.
33.  See section 2 for the case of Emilia and G. alfani, 2010a, for an overview of the 
action of North Italian food provision authorities during the famine. Note however that insti-
tutions and access to markets did play a role at a later stage in the crisis. In the case of Genua 
for example, the city suffered in 1590 and 1591 but from 1592, thanks to an effective public 
policy aimed at opening new trade routes with North Europe, it became possible to import 
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The geographic position is the best explanation of why these places 
escaped the crisis. In fact, the relationship with the territory established by 
mountain dwellers was very different from that of plain dwellers, being 
characterised by a lower population density and a different crop regime 34. 
The second point is decisive, since the 1591-1592 crisis was essentially 
due to a grain shortage. Mountain populations based their nutrition on ani-
mal husbandry, horticulture, and the growth of specialized crops more than 
the populations in the lowlands and obviously suffered less from a lack of 
grain. Furthermore, the importance of arboreal crops typical of low and 
mid-mountain must not be neglected, above all the chestnut, which is very 
resistant to adverse climatic factors and whose fruit is highly caloriic and 
rich in vitamins 35. The fact that in years of good or normal crops many 
mountain communities imported grain from the plain is not in contrast with 
the conclusion that, during a severe grain crisis, those same communities 
show a relatively low vulnerability. This is only one of the perspectives 
from which we ind, during the 1590s crisis, a reversal of the « normal » 
condition.
If the Apennines, the Alps and Pre-Alps were largely spared by the 
famine, it is in the core of the cereal-growing Po plain that it reached its 
maximum severity. Here, some of the largest cities existing in Europe at 
the time depended on a demographic-agrarian system built upon ancient 
ties among cities, their contadi or surrounding countryside, and other food-
producing areas further away. It is this system, which is both economic 
and social in nature, that after a long period of continuous shortage entered 
into a crisis and inally broke down. In the next section I will analyze this 
process focussing on the case of Emilia, in normal times characterized by a 
particularly rich agriculture but badly affected by the crisis of the 1590s.
large quantities of grain from the Baltic not only for satisfying the local needs, but also for 
reselling to other Italian regions with huge proits (grenDi, E., 1971; Costantini, C., 1978).
34. mathieu, J., 2000.
35.  About this, see also G. alfani, 2007a; 2010a; about the expansion of the cultivation 




2. The shock of regional systems: the case of Emilia
The most striking characteristic of the great famine of the 1590s, i.e. 
its length, caused the short-circuit of the Italian provision systems. My aim 
is now to describe and to explain this process, focussing on a particular 
region which in normal years was among the most fertile areas of the whole 
peninsula: Emilia. Positioned south of the River Po, which divides it from 
Lombardy and Veneto, Emilia today makes up most of the administrative 
region Emilia-Romagna. This is relevant to our case given that some of 
the statistics presented have been built on the base of such administrative 
boundaries; however, most of the other data is related to the cities of Modena 
and Bologna and the surrounding countryside, at the very heart of Emilia. 
Romagna can roughly be identiied as that part of Emilia-Romagna placed 
south of the River Reno (crossing the territory of Bologna and Imola, later 
reaching the sea to the north of Ravenna; see Figure 3); the rest of the region 
is Emilia.
Figure 3. The region Emilia-Romagna, current administrative boundaries
In Emilia-Romagna the famine struck hard everywhere. In the cities, 
the prices of wheat reached extremely high levels. In the case of Modena, 
the price of 390 soldi per staro in 1591 was unprecedented and would be 
exceeded only in the seventeenth century, due to the well-known inla-
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
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tionary trend characterizing most of the Early Modern period. Figure 4 
shows the quick rise in prices, from the 150.05 soldi per staro of 1588, to 
169.5 in 1589 (+13% on a year-to-year base) to 276.75 in 1590 (+ 63.3%) 
and to 390 in 1591 (+ 40.9%): the inal price being more than two and a half 
times that preceding the crisis.
Figure 4. Soldi per staro of wheat paid in the city of Modena, 1560-1620
Source. Basini, G. L., 1970.
The prices remained high also in the years following 1591, beginning 
(briely) to approach the pre-crisis levels only in 1594-1595. It must be said, 
though, that in the case of extreme famines such as this one, food prices 
fail to fully relect the gravity of the situation. At a certain point during the 
crisis, the price paid for wheat and other cereals on the urban markets is no 
longer an index of the real possibility of inding food in the cities. To put 
it bluntly, there is a price, but there is no wheat. For the authorities, then, 
the problem becomes that of inding resources which are to be rationed and 
distributed to the starving population, mostly freely (practically nobody can 
afford to pay, and anyway there is no food being sold on the market). In 
Bologna, already on irst September 1590 private stocks of food reserves 
were requisitioned by the vicelegato (the governor) to be distributed by 
the government 36. Private reserves, however, could not last long and soon 
it became necessary to import food from outside the ‘Bolognese contado’. 
When the situation becomes extreme, provision authorities even stop wor-
























































rying about how indebted they might become in order to buy food, as in 
Modena in 1593, when the city does not ask the Dukes of Este for money to 
buy wheat, but to only ind some wheat for which the city itself is willing 
to pay, at any price:
« Continuing the third miserable year and perhaps worse than the past, we beg 
Your Highness to provide your city with the quality and quantity of grain that 
is suficient to feed your extremely devoted people and with the best possible 
conditions, the community offering to pay the agreed prices [...], because there are 
supplies of bread for the people for no more than eight days, we beg you to give 
prompt assistance so that no disorder occurs » (cit. in G. L. Basini, 1970, p. 7, my 
translation).
Whereas in the irst years of the crisis the state of the public inance 
had been one of the aspects taken into account by the Modenese city au-
thorities, this issue is eventually dropped entirely: a sign of the short-cir-
cuit of all « normal » ways of reaction to the crisis. I shall return later to 
this point.
The cities were not the only ones to suffer. In those years, the food-
producing countryside suffered equally from the shortage, and even worse: 
given that the rural people enjoyed much less protection by the authorities 
compared to the citizens. In graph 3 are presented aggregate time series of 
baptisms (births) built with a methodology analogous to that used for Fig-
ure 5 37. The time series are related to the whole of Emilia-Romagna, and 
include an estimate for the total population which is the result of a weight-
ed sum (according to the relevant urbanization rates) of the trend charac-
terizing: 1) the rural population; 2) that living in small cities (< 10,000 in-
habitants); 3) that living in large cities (> 10,000 inhabitants). These three 
components are also shown in the graph.
The trend of births reconstructed for the whole of Emilia-Romagna 
follows closely that of the rural population. This fact is simply due to the 
prevalence of this component on the total: even considering that the urbani-
zation rates of the area were very high, the share of Northern Italian popu-
lation living in large cities has been estimated by De Vries 38 to be around 
15.1% in 1550 and 16.6% in 1600, while that of population living in small 
cities (5,000-9,999 inhabitants) would be 5.21 and 5.01 respectively. Other 
urbanization estimates exist, but all of them conirm the general conclusion 
37.  Actually, the series for Northern Italy presented in Figure 1 is a weighted sum of 
regional time series, one of which is the Emilia-Romagna time series presented in Figure 3. 
About this methodology see G. alfani, 2007a; 2010a and, for greater detail, G. Alfani, 
2004a.
38. De vries, J., 1984.
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that about 4/5 of the population lived in rural communities or in sparse set-
tlements.
Figure 5. Reconstruction of births in Emilia-Romagna, 1530-1628
Source. Database G. alfani.
To understand the nature of a severe subsistence crisis, the most useful 
conclusion from graph 3 is that, if we look at the time series for the rural and 
for the urban populations, we ind in all instances a severe drop in births. 
This is slightly worse in the cities than in the countryside, but the key point 
is that in the early 1590s everybody was badly affected by the crisis. This 
happened in different ways and for different reasons, and with a very differ-
ent role being played by the local and national authorities.
In the cities, the main issue was to maintain the order and avoid revolts. 
Even feeding the people came to represent a kind of ancillary end – given 
that it was impossible to avoid riots without providing the population with a 
minimum of food. As has been recently suggested, poverty and hunger are 
not the principal reason but just one of many possible causes for popular 
revolt in the late Middle Ages 39. At the same time, it is certainly true that 
during a famine the crime rate and the general propensity for violence in-
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crease dramatically. City authorities were well aware of this, and during se-
vere subsistence crises they regularly decided to expel the so-called « useless 
mouths »: people without citizenship, who were beggars, jobless foreigners, 
or even those employed but without any highly professionalizing skill 40. 
This is what happened in Bologna in 1590 41 while in Napoli, also affected 
by the famine, a decision was taken to expel foreigners and students 42. The 
following year, the poor or jobless foreigners were expelled from the whole 
of the territory of the small Duchy of Mantua 43. These are only examples of 
decrees of expulsion which had three main objectives: irst, to reserve the 
scant food available for the citizens and people having more « right » to it in 
general; secondly, to avoid overcrowding and the outbreak of epidemics (of 
typhus or others); thirdly, to ensure that the poor, bound to suffer the worst 
because of the crisis, would not revolt, cause damage to urban property and 
steal what food they could ind, thus depleting the shrinking reserves.
The expulsion of the poor was, on one hand, a « normal » way of 
facing the worst crises, but on the other hand it also represented the 
failure of a system which was unable to care for increasing numbers 
of people in need. The urban élites had mixed feelings about the dificult 
choices that had to be made. For example in Bologna in 1590, according 
to the chronicler Pompeo Vizzani, the city expelled the rural population 
that had locked into the city led by desperation (no food was to be found 
in the countryside). An attempt however was made to help them outside 
the walls: it was decreed that four ounces of rice per head were to be dis-
tributed daily in speciic points of the contado. Vizzani, who was close 
to the city government, tends to throw a positive light on this as well as 
other initiatives taken to feed the urban poor – many of whom were actu-
ally interned to prevent trouble. However the same author enables us to 
judge for ourselves the effectiveness of this charity, by stating that about 
10,000 poor died in the city of Bologna, and about 30,000 in the contado: 
hardly a great success for the food provision authorities.
The fact that in the lowlands of Emilia more people died in the coun-
tryside than in the city should not come as a surprise. During the famine of 
40.  These useless mouths were the main victims of all the urban crises typical of the 
Late Medieval or Early Modern periods: be they sieges, famines, or plagues. They are, how-
ever, clearly an under-studied category. For an attempt at making clear their condition, the 
risks they incurred and their complex juridical situation, see G. alfani, 2010a. 
41.  vizzani, P., 1608.
42.  CorraDi, A., 1973.
43.  Belfanti, C. M., 1982, p. 107-109.
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the 1590s, the same happened in Parma 44 as well as in many other cities. 
This does not depend solely on the fact that most of the population lived in 
the countryside, but may be the symptom of higher mortality rates. Para-
doxically, during a bad famine the traditional relationship of city and coun-
tryside, the irst consuming food and the other producing it, is reversed: 
with the rural people looking to the cities as sources of food. It was in the 
cities, in fact, that the food provision authorities were placed: authorities 
that (theoretically) had the means to look for food in distant areas of the 
State, in other States, and even across the sea, and whose action during the 
worst famines was considered fundamental to ensure the presence of grain 
in the urban market 45. What the rural people, in their desperation, failed to 
understand is that those were urban authorities unwilling, or unable, to help 
them. When they realized this fact, usually the hard way, they fell prey to 
dreams of mythical lands full of food. In the 1590s, at the peak of the crisis, 
the rural people of Emilia mass-migrated to Lombardy only to discover that 
the peasants of Lombardy were themselves migrating southwards. They 
were repeating old mistakes but, as brilliantly clariied by Piero Campo-
resi 46, nothing was more capable of causing self-suggestion among the des-
perate than the slow torment of hunger. At the time of the 1539 famine, the 
rural people of the Modena contado had behaved similarly:
« They left with all their belongings and family and went to Lombardy, and most 
of them to [the city of] Pavia, because it was said that there they were distributing 
gnocchi with spices and butter and well sprinkled with cheese (...) and that they tied 
the vineyards with yellow sausages ». (Tomasino de’ Bianchi, cit. in G. L. Basini, 
1970, p. 14, my translation). 
Fifty years later, their descendants proved to have learnt nothing from 
the, often fatal, misjudgement of their predecessors and once again set foot 
on the very same path of hope. While such behaviour caused economic 
concerns to the authorities (the migrant peasants often stole the cattle and 
property of the landowners), it also became a further scourge inlicted upon 
the countryside: where roving bands of hungry peasants devastated what 
was left of the crops, and sometimes even converted into brigands prone 
to violence 47. I will further develop this point in the next section. It would 
44.  romani, m. a., 1975.
45.  About the functions of the annone (food provision authorities) in Early Moden Italy, 
functions which tended to expand during and after the 1590s crisis, see G. alfani, 2010a, 
p. 118-124; strangio, D., 1998; marin, B. & virlouvet, C., 2003.
46.  Camporesi. p., 1981; 1985.
47.  This situation of widespread violence, especially – but not only –  in the countryside, 
is to be found all over Italy during the famine. See for example, for the Republic of Venice, 
C. povolo 1986, and for the Papal State, I. polverini fosi, 1985.
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be unfair, however, to think that the rural masses were always unable to 
understand the real situation and were not « rational » enough to react in 
the right way. On the contrary, the farmers of Emilia had long been aware 
of the danger represented by the growing imbalance between population 
and food production capacity. Proof of this is the slow evolution from the 
open ield, to the farming technique called « chiusura », and then to the 
more intensive « piantata » 48. This transformation, which began at the end 
of ifteenth century and was completed around 1620, sacriiced food variety 
in favour of greater availability of calories and established an alimentary 
model based almost solely on bread and wine 49. While this process of in-
novation can be understood in terms of a « Boserupian » chain-reaction 
induced by demographic pressure 50, it was too slow to compensate for a 
population growing very quickly 51. It also became a factor of fragility for 
the agrarian-demographic system, given that an excessive reliance upon 
wheat exposed the farmers and peasants of Emilia to greater risks in times 
of meteorological conditions particularly unfavourable to grain. This is pre-
cisely what happened in the 1590s, when the inhabitants were left without 
any real option, became desperate and then fell prone to the « irrational » 
behaviour already described. Overall, this outcome would surely be better 
qualiied as « Malthusian » than as « Boserupian » 52.
It should be clear by now that a deining characteristic of the worst 
subsistence crises is the temporary rupture of the social, economic and even 
legal and administrative equilibria. In the initial phase, the authorities can 
48.  Chiusure and piantate are surrounded by hedges, fences or ditches to keep out ani-
mals grazing in surrounding ields. The changeover to the piantata is characterised by the 
progressive reduction of the grazing area in favour of the cultivated area with the consequent 
abandonment of semi-nomadic animal husbandry (Cattini, M., 1984, p. 28-37).
49.  Cattini, M., 1984.
50.  According to E. Boserup, 1965 and 1981, demographic pressure itself promotes 
technological micro-innovations to traditional practices and permits a slow increase in total 
population by starting a chain reaction. A periodic « malthusian » re-equilibrium of popula-
tion and resources is not necessary. As matter of fact, in sixteenth century Italy both Boseru-
pian and Malthusian population dynamics are to be found, as explained in G. alfani 2007a; 
2010a; 2011a.
51.  alfani, g., 2007a; 2010a.
52.  Malthusian and Boserupian population dynamics, which are usually presented as 
contrasting (see for example, M. livi BaCCi, 1997), can also be combined and considered 
as one integrating the other. This is for example the case of Ronald Lee’s dynamic synthesis 
(lee, r., 1986), which I have applied to the Italian case elsewhere (alfani, g., 2011a). Also 
see the recent synthesis by N. Cuffaro, 2001, on the different views about the relationship 
between population, economic growth and technological innovations, and on the conditions 
of applicability of the original Boserupian theory.
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manage the reserves 53 stockpiled to answer to « normal » years of scarcity 
(according to an estimate, one year out of four was affected by bad crops 54). 
When the crisis continues year after year, frustrating all expectations of 
improvement, both the provision authorities and the « private » means of 
protection fail, one after the other. Their failure follows the shock of a com-
plex system of economic, social and demographic relationships which in 
normal years, and even in « normal crises », regulates the low of food and 
other resources within communities; from rural to urban areas; from city to 
city; from state to state; etc 55.
Duration, then, is a key factor in understanding why the famine of the 
1590s probably came to be the worst ever faced by Italian populations, at 
least since the Black Death and maybe since a much earlier period. The 
other key factor is extent: as seen in section 1, crops were ruined all over 
Italy, forcing the Italian states to be creative in looking for food (most of 
the traditional provision paths having failed and market forces alone being 
unable to provide solutions).
Feeding the large cities lourishing close to the shores of the Medi-
terranean had represented a problem since ancient times and required the 
organisation of the distribution of food over long distances 56. In the case 
of Italy during the sixteenth century, the rising power of the Turkish em-
pire was making it increasingly dificult to get grain from the Black Sea; 
hence the rising importance of the Baltic market, which made it necessary 
to buy the services of English or Dutch merchants. These sources of food, 
however, were secondary with respect to the control of the contado which 
the Annone were enforcing with increasing effectiveness 57. In the course 
53.  About the nature of the reserves, their economic status and their distribution among 
institutions and private owners, see R. Corritore, 2007 and G. alfani, 2010a.
54.  sliCher van Bath, B. H., 1977.
55.  The fact that provision was based upon ancient systems of economic, social and 
demographic interaction is not the same as stating that the food markets in Italy, or even more 
speciically in Emilia, presented a large degree of integration. As a matter of fact, for all of the 
Early Modern period most of the food produced continued to be consumed within the parish, 
or within the local system composed of a city with its contado. According to the theory of the 
overlapping circles proposed by P. Chaunu, 1974, 90% of the product was consumed within 
the parish circle. Only the remaining 10% entered the market: that of the relevant city. We can 
think of the space related to this circle as a city-contado system. Only 10% of this 10%, or 1% 
of the total, travelled the long distance, often by sea. By and large this picture well describes 
our case. It must be pointed out, though, that during severe famines these long-distance con-
nections acquired key importance.
56. marin, B. & virlouvet, C., 2003.
57. alfani, g., 2010a.
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of the sixteenth century such control was evolving towards more complex 
systems, aimed at controlling the circulation of food in the entire terri-
tory of the State 58. While this general process was completed only in the 
seventeenth century, in many places the famine of the 1590s provided the 
fundamental stimulus to introduce key innovations, like in Bologna where 
new laws introduced in 1593 gave the authorities powerful instruments to 
closely monitor the grain market and the process of bread production 59. 
The innovations were not introduced in this period by chance, but because 
the crisis had made apparent the faults of the existing institutions. These 
faults, furthermore, would prove very expensive for the public inances, 
drained by the effort of inding grain abroad at whatever price. For the case 
of Modena, Pierluigi Basini 60 calculated that, during the famine, the city 
spent the enormous sum of 3.5 million lire to buy foreign grain. At the end 
of the crisis the city was completely drained of gold and silver, and was 
deeply indebted not only to the Duke, but also to religious institutions and 
to wealthy individuals. A similar situation was to be found in much of Italy, 
both in cities and in the countryside, and was further aggravated by the in-
ability of people to pay tax – given that they had spent all of their money to 
buy what food was available. For example, in Finale in Emilia the revenues 
from the colta ordinaria fell by 14% in 1590 compared to the previous year, 
and in 1591 shrank by another 54.5% 61.
So deep and widespread was the crisis, and so deeply compromised 
were public and private inances, that we could wonder how Italian econo-
mies ever recovered. In the case of Modena, the (forced) good will of the 
Dukes of Este, who accepted delays in repayment of the debt, was a key 
factor. This, however, would not have been enough had the local economy 
been any less strong and dynamic. Instead, at the end of sixteenth cen-
tury the silk sector was lourishing, as well as the trade of wine, spirits 
and others 62. For reasons of space it is impossible to further develop this 
point here. Sufice it to say that the situation of Modena can be taken as 
representative of much of Italy. After the famine, the peninsula showed an 
impressive economic dynamism which is very badly described by Cipolla’s 
deinition of « Indian summer ». On the contrary, it is proof of the fact that 
Italian economies were still sound and that their crisis, when it inally came, 
58.  Pult Quaglia, A. M., 1982; parziale, L., 2003.
59.  guenzi, A., 1978. See, for some other case studies, massa, P., 1999 (Genova); Bas-
ini, G. L., 1970 (Modena); zanetti, D., 1964 (Pavia).
60.  Basini, G. L., 1970.
61.  Cattini, M., 1977, p. 192-193.
62.  Basini, g. l., 1970, p. 73-74.
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
36
did not have its roots in the  « mistakes » made in the decades following the 
end of the Wars of Italy 63.
3. A closer look to the countryside: Nonantola
Nonantola is a large rural town close to Modena and, like Modena, was 
part of the Duchy of Ferrara ruled by the Este family (in 1598, when Fer-
rara became part of the State of the Church, Modena itself became capital 
of the Duchy). In 1629, Nonantola had a population of 3.439 inhabitants 64: 
a remarkable size, which is surely close to that already reached before the 
crisis of the 1590s. Situated in the lowlands of the Po plain, Nonantola was 
characterized by the presence of vast common lands, which still survive to-
day in the shape of a partecipanza agraria. It is not by chance that the rights 
to the use of the commons, which previously were given to all the inhabi-
tants of the community, became hereditary among a well deined number 
of « original families » in 1584: a period when the strain upon the land and 
the resources generated by population growth had already become appar-
ent, and the original families were looking with increasing concern at the 
continuous inlux of migrants aspiring to the right to use the commons 65.
At the time of the crisis of the 1590s, the presence of the commons 
proved insuficient to preserve the population from hunger. In this circum-
stance at least, Nonantola’s unusual agrarian structure and land distribution 
do not make it an exceptional case during the famine 66. On the contrary, 
Nonantola can be taken as an example of a lowland rural community, fo-
cussed on the production of wheat and wine, which was struck badly by the 
famine. In 1591-1592, when the average reduction in births in the parts of 
Northern Italy affected by the crisis was 45.5%, in Nonantola it amounted 
63.  alfani, g., 2010a.
64.  Estimated on the base of a salt tax register (City Archive of Nonantola, Ruolo di 
popolazione - Boccatico, 1629).
65.  alfani, G., 2007b; 2007c; 2011c.
66.  One could think that the availability of common resources allowed peasants to sur-
vive better in time of famine. This hypothesis has been tested and proved false (alfani, G., 
2004c; 2007b): probably because the availability of such resources was over-compensated 
by incentive to immigration (at least until the closure of the books in 1584 and the exclusion 
of foreigners from the use of the commons ) and disincentive to emigration, similarly to the 
indings of L. Del panta, V. fiorentini & P. mortoni, 1999, in their case study of the nearby 
community of Cento, also hosting a partecipanza agraria (emigrating meant losing the right 
to beneit from the common lands). On the other hand, it is possible that the presence of large 
commons was coupled with an unusual abundance of small properties, notoriously more frag-
ile than average in times of crisis. This second hypothesis is as yet untested.
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to 65%. Even more impressive is the trend in mortality, which it is possible 
to study thanks to rare parish registers of burials beginning in 1574: well 
before the Rituale Romanum of 1614, which made such registers manda-
tory. These early registers also have the bonus of recording the age at death. 
It is possible to calculate, then, an increase in burials of 346% in 1591-1592. 
Graph 3 shows the dynamic of the main vital events affected by the famine: 
births (baptisms), deaths (burials), and marriages.
The case of Nonantola is representative of all great demographic cri-
ses: whose effects do not only concern mortality but also affect fertility and 
marriage. As shall be seen, the disruption caused by a severe famine on 
social, economic and demographic systems is further proof that thinking of 
a demographic crisis solely in terms of mortality crisis 67, albeit useful and 
sometimes unavoidable, is nevertheless insuficient to fully understand the 
nature of the crisis itself.
Figure 6. Baptisms, burials, marriages in Nonantola, 1580-1605
Source. Parish registers of baptisms, burials and marriages, 
Parish archive of St Michele of Nonantola.
Figure 6 allows us to describe the famine from the point of view of the 
trend of vital events. At the beginning of the crisis, when scarcity begins 
to be felt, there is a drop in births which is due to the reduced fecundity of 
starving men and women, to a decrease of sexual desire, and maybe also 
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to conscious efforts of couples to avoid pregnancies 68. At the same time, 
with a perfectly matching chronology, there is a decrease in the number of 
marriages: it being common, due both to rational thinking and to a social 
and cultural context which required a marriage rite to be a rite of plenty, to 
avoid their celebration in times of scarcity. Only later do we ind a marked 
increase in deaths. This is due to the fact that the human body has an ex-
ceptional capacity to survive prolonged starvation. Actually, the number of 
people dying literally « of hunger » was usually very limited, more usual 
causes of death being « complications » and in particular infectious diseases 
(such as typhus) or poisoning caused by consuming inedible or rotten in-
gredients 69.
The fact that death by hunger comes only after a long and extreme 
condition of starvation explains why only in the worst famines do we ind 
a generalized increase in the death toll. To individuate a « normal » famine, 
the variations in baptisms and marriages are much more reliable indicators. 
The exceptional character of the crisis of the 1590s, then, is conirmed by 
the sharp rise of mortality which comes after the irst year of scarcity. As 
shown by Figure 6, the peak in deaths is reached in 1591 when 200 burials 
are celebrated: equal to a mortality rate that can be estimated to be slightly 
higher than 60 per thousand. Mortality remained high the following year; 
began to decline in 1593; but peaked again in 1594 when, with 119 burials, 
a second peak was reached. This chronology suggests that while food pro-
vision authorities were gradually restoring the social and economic order 
in the cities, the conditions of the countryside were still precarious and we 
know that the year 1594 was one of crisis for all the lowlands around Mode-
na 70. As a matter of fact, during the whole of the Early Modern period only 
plagues caused worse crises in Nonantola. Even though epidemic crises 
were much shorter in duration, their death toll was much higher: especially 
at the time of the worst of all, the pandemic of 1629-1630 when mortality 
rates touched 260 per thousand in Nonantola while elsewhere in Northern 
Italy even higher rates were reached 71.
68.  On the complex biological and social-demographic consequences of a state of star-
vation, see M. livi BaCCi, 1991; 1998. 
69.  livi BaCCi, m., 1998; alfani, g., 2010a.
70.  Cattini, M., 1988.
71.  alfani, G. & Cohn, S. K., 2007b; alfani, g., 2010b; 2011b.
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Analyzing the monthly distribution of burials in the years 1591-1594 72 
in Figure 7, we ind an absolute maximum in May 1591. As already under-
lined, it is during this year that famine killed the largest number of people 
(even if migrations and vagrancy make it dificult to compare deaths with 
the number of residents at each moment). It is a sure fact that the period of 
acute scarcity faced by the population in 1591 exhausted what capacity was 
left in the local agrarian and social-economic system to compensate for luc-
tuations in food production. As a consequence, in the following three years 
mortality closely followed the crop cycle. The peaks in burials are to be 
found in the months immediately preceding the new harvest (March-June). 
The harvest, even when it is scarce, does not fail to alleviate the situation 
albeit for some months only. This trend in mortality follows closely that of 
the seasonal prices in the urban market, even in normal years 73. On the other 
hand, it is a well known fact that, during a famine, the apparent abundance at 
harvest time combines with the widespread psychological instability that is 
one of the consequences of prolonged starvation 74, inducing people to waste 
what they should save, both to provide for the alimentary needs of winter 
and spring months and to preserve seeds for the next crop.
Figure 7. Monthly burials in Nonantola (January 1591-December 1594)
Source. Parish Archive of St Michele of Nonantola, Parish Registers of Burials. 
72.  Even if mortality was very high already in 1590 (80 burials), for that year the scarce 
quality of the records make it impossible to distribute burials on a monthly basis.
73.  zanetti, D., 1964, p. 108-111.
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As already explained, mortality is a very limited perspective from 
which to consider subsistence crises that have much more complex demo-
graphic consequences. In the case of Nonantola, however, the availability of 
exceptional sources invites further development of the analysis of mortality: 
especially considering that the relationship between hunger and mortality 
is a complex one which still has many obscure points. As Andrew Appleby 
underlined some decades ago 75, not only is it dificult to deine whether mor-
tality was due to hunger or to concomitant epidemics, but the causal relation-
ship between them needs to be speciied. It is not sure at all that epidemics 
of diseases such as typhus, frequent during famines, were due to starvation. 
Quite possibly it was mobility induced by hunger that was responsible for 
outbreaks of contagious diseases: the poor went to the cities looking for aid, 
bringing the disease with them or favouring its appearance by causing a situ-
ation of overcrowding. On the other hand, what we ind frequently in Italy 
during the famine of the 1590s, with poor and « useless mouths » being 
expelled from the cities in order to reduce overcrowding and the risk of epi-
demic, is the diffusion of infectious diseases in the countryside 76.
The rare registers to be found in Nonantola, by including age at death, 
give us precious information about the structure of mortality during a se-
vere famine and also offer hints about the main causes of deaths. Table 1 
compares the death structure in three different periods: the peak of the crisis 
in 1591-1592; the pre-crisis period 1588-1589 (it is impossible to include 
earlier years because registration of age at death becomes systematic only 
after 1587), and the post-crisis period 1594-1599. These two « normal » 
periods allow for a double check when trying to deine the speciic char-
acteristics of the mortality in years of acute hunger. In every period, some 
burials are recorded without age at death; the vast majority of registrations, 
however, is complete 77.
In the years 1591-1592, all age groups were affected by higher-than-
normal mortality, as clearly shown by the yearly averages for the three peri-
ods. The maximum difference in yearly deaths between the famine and the 
pre- or post- crisis periods, however, is to be found among people aged 4 to 
60. What is left is the newborn, the very young and the very old. As a mat-
ter of fact, looking at the frequencies (the share of total deaths for each age 
75.  appleBy, A. B., 1977; 1978.
76.  alfani, G., 2010a.
77.  In general, books of burials did not include the stillborn. They did include children 
dying immediately after birth if they had received the sacrament of baptism, which in situa-
tions of emergency (in casu necessitatis) could be performed by the midwife.
Guido Alfani
41
group) we ind an impressive reduction in the share of deaths related to the 
newborn. While in « normal » years babies below the age of one accounted 
for a third of the total (34.3% in 1588-1589 and 32.4% in 1595-1599), at the 
peak of the famine the igure was just 14.1%. This fact, however, should be 
read in the light of the age structure of the population: considering that in 
1591-1592 births reduced by 65% compared to pre-crisis level, the actual 
mortality rates of the newborn had probably increased in their turn. After 
the crisis, the age structure of mortality did not immediately return to its 
pre-crisis condition, mainly because the age structure of the population had 
changed: in 1595-1599, given the lack of births in the earlier years, there 
were few infants in the age groups 1-3 and 4-10, and consequently they ac-
counted for a smaller than normal share of overall deaths.
Table. 1. Age at death in Nonantola, 1588-1599
Burials TOT with age <1 1-3 4-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 >70
1588-1589 120 102 35 17 13 4 4 4 4 13 7 1
1591-1592 313 262 37 20 41 26 25 32 23 35 12 11
1595-1599 231 219 71 12 11 21 20 19 20 25 9 11
Yearly averages:
1588-1589 60.0 51.0 17.5 8.5 6.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.5 3.5 0.5
1591-1592 156.5 131.0 18.5 10.0 20.5 13.0 12.5 16.0 11.5 17.5 6.0 5.5
1595-1599 38.5 43.8 14.2 2.4 2.2 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.0 5.0 1.8 2.2
Frequencies:
1588-1589 100.0 34.3 16.7 12.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 12.7 6.9 1.0
1591-1592 100.0 14.1 7.6 15.6 9.9 9.5 12.2 8.8 13.4 4.6 4.2
1595-1599 100.0 32.4 5.5 5.0 9.6 9.1 8.7 9.1 11.4 4.1 5.0
Source. Parish archives od St. Michele of Nonantola, Parish Registers of Burials.
The construction of age-speciic mortality rates requires further reine-
ment of the dataset and will not be undertaken here 78. The available data 
already suggests a key conclusion: that sharp increases in mortality affected 
all age groups, and that during the year of the crisis the « natural » order, 
with the very young dying much more frequently than the adults, is re-
versed by adult supermortality coupled with reduced fertility. As it is, how-
78.  In particular, to calculate mortality rates information about the age structure before, 
during and after the famine would be needed. This information is not currently available and 
will require further archival research to be collected.
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ever, the data does not allow a clear hypothesis about the cause of death and 
the occurrence of infectious diseases. To this end, deaths should be linked to 
households in a way similar to that attempted for the plague striking Nonan-
tola in 1630 79 . Such a task presents archival and methodological dificulties 
still to be resolved and will be the object of a speciic future work.
The database I built for Nonantola also allows for analysis of mortal-
ity rates per social group. Since this was a rural town close to an important 
city, most of the notables having property or other economic interests in 
Nonantola did not live there, and thus were not recorded in its books of 
burials. The only analysis of mortality per social group having statistical 
relevance, then, is the one that separates the partecipanti (people having 
the right to the beneit of the common lands) from the non partecipanti (all 
the others). As shown by Figure 8, however, this key distinction within 
Nonantola society did not exert a signiicant inluence on mortality during 
the famine and will not be discussed further here.
Figure 8. Burials of partecipanti and non partecipanti, 1588-1596
Source. Parish archives od St. Michele of Nonantola, Parish Registers of Burials.
It must be stated clearly that the trend in burials/deaths is not only an 
index of the demographic tendency of the community, neither it is simply 
the mirror of the cycle of reserves and crops. Instead, it is representative of 
the progressive failure and crumbling of a complex demographic, economic 
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and social system whose components were strictly interrelated. An increase 
in deaths, then, is surely the sign of the failure of the harvest and of the 
exhaustion of reserves, but it is also the result of the failure of the safety 
nets of help and solidarity provided by the State and by the community. 
Furthermore, it is affected by the increased violence generated both by sus-
picion and envy towards neighbours, and by the presence of brigands and 
vagabonds in hiding near the community, waiting for an opportunity to steal 
its meagre reserves.
Many examples of this protracted state of violence are to be found in 
the books of the Captain of Nonantola 80: thefts of food; of small animals 
(pigeons, chickens...) as well as of cows and other large animals; disputes 
among neighbours over almost anything; brawls; wounding; homicides. On 
top of these, nightly armed assaults on isolated houses, perpetrated by the 
starving, desperate people roaming the countryside. An example will suf-
ice: that of Marchino Borsari who, in March 1591, was assaulted in his 
own house by a group of armed foreigners. Here is the description he gave 
to the Captain of that terrible night:
« Last Thursday night, when it had already struck seven o’clock, I and my wife be-
ing asleep in this bed, I heard a whistle at a window […] I immediately jumped out 
of bed to see what it was […] and dressing myself as best I could with this blanket 
you can see, I encountered one armed with a wheel harquebus and a sword, who 
attacked me and straightaway another unarmed man arrived, who took a pitch fork 
that was there and thrust it in my shoulder and passed as far as the bone, and all of 
a sudden two others arrived unarmed and jumped on me and tied my arms behind 
my back, and then with a thin rope tied me up by my testicles, attached the rope 
to the iron that you see attached to the beam […] above here, and tormenting me 
for a long time demanded money, and when I told them I had none they replied 
that they knew my affairs better than I did, and so taking [some] of my sacks they 
took away wheat lour for three measures, which I had in a trunk, more than forty 
unbaked loaves of grain[…] and also a harquebus and a silver ring with a red stone 
[…] twenty-four salamis [...] ». 81 (my translation) 
The case of Marchino is only one among many, and the authorities 
struggled to maintain order. If they had hoped that the four people hanged 
on the main square of Nonantola on 11 March 1591 would be an effective 
warning 82, the episode mentioned above, reported 18 March, shows that 
80.  Town Archive of Nonantola, Archivio aggregato-Giusdicenza di Nonantola, Atti 
criminali del Capitano di Ragione: Libri Querelarum, January-February 1592.
81.  Libri Querelarum, 18 March 1591.
82.  Parish Archive of St. Michele of Nonantola, Paris registers of burials, 11 March 
1591.
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
44
they were mistaken. On the other hand, the main threat came from outside 
the community.
The case of Nonantola makes it apparent that the famine caused the 
short-circuit not only of the institutions, but of the very way of life in the 
community. From this perspective, the case is representative of the general 
situation of the Italian countryside. When, after 1594, the crisis ended, 
population growth began again and the demographic damage caused by 
starvation, typhus (etc.) was mended surprisingly quickly. The social and 
economic breakdown caused by the famine, however, had long-lasting ef-
fects. Near Nonantola, in the rural town of San Felice sul Panaro, the fam-
ine had reduced many families to a condition of poverty. They had to sell 
their houses, automatically accepting a drop in their social status, in favour 
of a few rich people: mainly « foreigners » from the city of Modena, well 
provided with both grain and coin. The increase in concentration of wealth 
was followed by a growing social and political closure of the community, 
where an impoverished élite tried to preserve its prestige, the economic 
decline notwithstanding 83. Similar processes, of which the accaparratori 
(hoarders) were the main beneiciaries, in the 1590s are to be found all 
over Italy.
*
The extent and duration of the subsistence crisis affecting not only 
Northern Italy but also most of the peninsula in the years 1590-1593 are 
what makes it exceptional: being the worst famine since the Black Death 
at least. Its consequences were not purely demographic, but are better un-
derstood as a « system shock » affecting demographic, social and economic 
structures: a shock that occurred when the crisis continued beyond expecta-
tions, causing the depletion of all reserves stored by individuals and food 
provision institutions and authorities, thus leading to the inal failure of the 
institutions themselves.
While provision institutions are speciic to the urban environment, 
their activity must be studied in the perspective of the relationship city-
countryside: both because one of their main aims was to control the food 
produced in the contado, and because the destiny and behaviour of the rural 
people during the famine can not be understood without taking into 
account their reliance upon the cities to survive in times of dire need. 
83. Cattini, M., 1984.
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During a severe famine, in fact, the « natural » order, according to 
which the countryside feeds the city, is reversed: with rural population de-
pending on the cities for their survival, at least until the provision authori-
ties decide to reserve what food is left to the citizens, expelling the poor 
and the peasants from within the city walls. These unfortunate people, 
then, begin wandering the countryside or migrate, following delusions 
of plenty which is just beyond their reach. This is the destiny, for example, 
of the rural population of Emilia in the 1590s.
The social disruption and the situation of violence and turmoil that 
characterize the famine years are also key in understanding the nature of 
the crisis, as shown by the case study of Emilia and of the rural town of 
Nonantola in particular. Here, violence, theft and murder made it all the 
more dificult for the community and its authorities to counter-balance the 
failure of the traditional networks of solidarity and reciprocal help, and to 
keep in check a crisis whose gravity is clearly shown by the sharp increase 
in burials. Not last among the proofs of the ability of a severe famine to 
deeply disrupt traditional equilibria, we ind a surge in adult mortality 
that temporarily reverses the usual prevalence of infant mortality over all 
other components of mortality. The case study of Nonantola, however, 
only strengthened the conclusion reached by considering Emilia or even 
the whole of Northern Italy: Old Regime famines should not be analyzed 
solely as mortality crises, or even as demographic crises (which include 
other factors such as fertility, marriage and migration), but as situations 
of stress of agrarian, demographic, social and economic structures, which 
in the worst cases result in the short-circuit of the whole system. In this 
perspective, the famine is not solely the result of the combination of cli-
mate, agrarian technology and demographic density, but is the much more 
complex product of a « human failure » than can be fully understood only 
by taking into account also institutions, culture, social and economic be-
haviour, and even psychological factors.
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